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U.S. 'public health officials and regulators
have long been aware of the risks of crys-
talline silica. Certain high-exposure occu-
pations using this ubiquitous material-
whose most common form is sand-have
caused serious, debilitating silicosis. More
recently, concerns have been begun to be
expressed about potentially wider risks to
the general public from environmental
exposure. A 1993 headline dedared: "Cancer
Scare: How Sand on a Beach Came to Be
Defined as Human Carcinogen" (1).
These concerns stem largely from lists
of carcinogens published by the U.S. gov-
ernment or international groups. Once
published, these lists trigger regulatory
requirements-most significantly the
requirement that listed substances be
labeled as cancer hazards. Then, once
warnings are displayed, a chemical becomes
the subject of public concern, and,
inevitably, fright. The 1993 Wall Street
Journal article quotes a father reading a
cancer label as he fills his child's sandbox:
"Why am I letting my daughter play in
something that says right on the label, it
causes cancer?"(1)
Sand (quartz) is the most common
form of crystalline silica, but this most
abundant substance on the land surface of
the earth is also found in a wide variety of
minerals. Because of widespread natural
occurrence, crystalline silica becomes air-
borne through both natural and anthro-
pogenic forces. It is not surprising that air-
borne crystalline silica is commonly found
in both urban and rural settings.
Once concerns were raised about crys-
talline silica, the response (as is common
for many chemicals) was to assess the risks
quantitatively to find out to what extent
this "probable" carcinogen would really
cause any cancer, among children in sand-
boxes, or anyone elsewhere. Employing the
many tools of quantitative risk assessment
(QRA) developed over the past 30 years,
regulators attempted to determine how sig-
nificant, ifat all, is that risk.
Attempts to determine risks of low
exposure to crystalline silica are still in their
infancy. No QRA has to date been accept-
ed by any government agency in the
United States. This state of affairs should
not, however, be cause for concern. The
government and public will be ill-served by
development ofcrystalline silica QRAs and
debate about hypothetical risks of low
exposures. Rather, public health experts
should focus on the known target, namely,
those workplaces where high silicosis-caus-
ing exposures are still occurring. As dis-
cussed here, the lack ofutility ofcrystalline
silica QRA emerges once one considers the
very large uncertainties in, and the inade-
quacy of, the existing crystalline silica data-
base for quantifying risks, and the fact that
environmental exposures are ubiquitous.
These factors argue against focusing regula-
tory attention on determining some low,
"safe" exposure level.
Regulatory Background
In 1988, based on a 1986 working group
conclusion that evidence of carcinogenici-
ty, although limited in humans, was suffi-
cient in animals (2), the International
Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC)
included crystalline silica on its list of
probable human carcinogens (3).
The IARC classification triggered the
U.S. Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's (OSHA) Hazard
Communication Standard (HCS) require-
ment that products containing more than
0.1% ofany IARC-listed probable carcino-
gen be labeled as potential cancer hazards.
The U.S. National Toxicology Program
followed IARC's lead and, in 1991, also
listed respirable crystalline silica as "reason-
ably anticipated to be a carcinogen,"
another event that triggers OSHA warning
requirements.
Once listed, crystalline silica also faced
regulatory scrutiny in California. That
state's Proposition 65 warning require-
ments for the general public, like OSHA's
forworkers, are triggered by[ARC or NTP
listings. Moreover, California's air toxic
"hot spots" rules can require firms releasing
listed substances to assess fenceline risks so
they can determine if they need to notify
neighbors.
Both [ARC and NTP declare their list-
ings are but the first hazard identification
step in risk assessment. As NTP puts it,
"evaluation of the degree of potential
human risk . . . requires a wider analysis"
(4). But, often no such "wider analysis"
occurs before OSHA and California notifi-
cation and warning requirements are trig-
gered. The warnings, moreover (indeed as
they are no doubt intended) raise public
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concerns that both industry and govern-
ment often find necessary to address.
Addressing those concerns has typically
been achieved through quantitatively
assessing risk.
Because sand had been labeled as
"probably" carcinogenic to humans, and
because it was felt necessary to tell the man
filling his sandbox or the neighbor of a
quarry whether he should be frightened by
the labels, both California and the U.S.
EPA began the QRA process. Before
reviewing that process, it is necessary to
summarize the crystalline silica health
effects data available to attempt to quanti-
fy its risk at low exposure levels.
Scientific Background
As [ARC found when it reviewed the crys-
talline silica literature, considerable data
exist, but those data have many uncertain-
ties and thus have been interpreted quite
differently in the scientific community.
Crystalline silica has increased the
number of lung tumors in several rat
inhalation studies, but mouse, hamster,
and guinea pig studies have not shown
increased tumors (5-9). And three of the
rat studies, because they were designed as
studies of compounds other than crys-
talline silica, administered only one dose,
and thus there is no evidence of a
dose-response relationship (10-12). In the
only two-dose rat study, lung tumor inci-
dences were nearly identical, although sili-
ca doses varied fivefold (13). As the senior
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investigator ofone ofthe positive rat stud-
ies writes, "[t]here is plenty ofevidence but
a great deal of uncertainty about what it
means" (14).
Another expert in fiber toxicology has
emphasized that great uncertainties exist in
attempting to use animal findings to pre-
dict human risk given a "pattern which
indicates that the rat lung responds to
widespread chronic damage and fibrosis
with tumor production much more readily
than other species" (15). He concludes:
"This makes the prediction ofcarcinogenic
hazard to humans very difficult, because
results from rats tend to exaggerate danger
levels, particularly when extremely high
doses are used" (15: p. 487).
The human data have their own uncer-
tainties. Although there have been more
than 50 worker epidemiology studies, few
studies are available of cohorts defined by
employment involving crystalline silica but
not other potentially carcinogenic expo-
sures. And, as is true in most epidemiology
studies that focus on lung cancer, smoking
could rarely be fully taken into account.
Just as importantly, past silica exposure
levels could only be approximated or
ranked in an ordinal fashion, if exposure
was estimated at all, in almost all studies.
In addition, the type ofcrystalline silica, its
chemistry and structure, has rarely been
well-characterized in epidemiology studies.
IARC called the epidemiologic evi-
dence as of 1986 "limited" (2). The chair
ofthe LARC panel emphasized shortly after
crystalline silica's listing that the evidence
for carcinogenicity of crystalline silica was
"indeed limited" (16). He thus noted that
"although credible, alternative explanations
such as chance, bias or confounding have
not been adequately excluded.... Without
more and better evidence it is premature to
conclude that exposure to crystalline silica
has caused lung cancer in man" (16: p.
290).
More than 30 epidemiologic papers
considering the relationship between silica,
silicosis, and lung cancer have been pub-
lished since the IARC review. However,
only about one-third of the studies are of
reasonably satisfactory design and presenta-
tion and primarily concerned with the
effects ofcrystalline silica exposure on lung
cancer risk. Fewer than 10 studies provided
some evidence of excess risk in exposed
workers. Three papers provide results
which, although individually unambiguous,
are nonetheless as awhole inconsistent.
Merlo et al. (17) studied 1022 men
employed 6 months or more manufactur-
ing refractory bricks in Genoa, Italy. There
were no obvious confounding exposures,
but the role of smoking could not be
assessed. By the end of 1986, 243 men had
died, 28 from lung cancer [standardized
mortality ratio (SMR) = 1.51; 95% CI,
1.00-2.18] and 40 from nonmalignant res-
piratory diseases (SMR = 2.41). There was
some suggestion that risk in both these dis-
ease groups was highest in workers
employed for 20 or more years before 1957
when dust controls were introduced, but
no other indication ofexposure dependen-
cywas reported.
Checkoway et al. (18) studied 2570
white male workers employed for one year
or more mining and calcining diatoma-
ceous earth in California, where the main
exposure was to cristobalite. Possible con-
founding exposure from the earlier use of
asbestos in some parts of the plant was
considered by the investigators; cohort
workers whose job titles were known to be
associated with regular exposure to asbestos
were excluded from the analyses.
Additional information that came to light
after the publication raises the possibility
of more pervasive asbestos exposure to a
substantial portion ofthe studied cohort.
By the end of 1987, of 628 observed
deaths, 59 were from lung cancer (SMR =
1.43) and 77 from nonmalignant respira-
tory disease (SMR = 2.27). A semiquanti-
tative index of cumulative dust and crys-
talline silica exposure was derived from
work histories, differences in airborne con-
centrations, crystalline silica content ofthe
products, era of employment, and respira-
tory protection. These were shown by
regression analysis to correlate with relative
risks for both lung cancer and nonmalig-
nant respiratory disease. As judged by the
limited information obtained on cigarette
smoking, there was no indication of
important confounding from this source.
The National Institute ofOccupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH) has updated a
mortality study at the Homestake Mine in
South Dakota (19). Lung cancer mortality
was not significantly elevated when nation-
al rates were used (SMR = 1.13; 95% CI,
0.93-1.36); there was marginal excess
when county rates were employed (SMR =
1.27; 95% CI, 1.02-1.55). No positive
exposure-response relationship was seen in
contrast to the observed silicosis and tuber-
culosis, where overall excess and positive
exposure-response gradients were observed.
Taken as a whole, the epidemiologic
evidence on crystalline silica exposure per
se inducing lung cancer in the absence of
lung fibrosis must still be considered scanty
and inconsistent, although biologically
plausible. Of the eight positive studies,
only one (18) showed a significant excess,
evidence of an exposure gradient for risk,
and reported absence of obvious con-
founders, and in this study the issue of
asbestos confounding is being reevaluated.
With the possible exception of the
Homestake study (19), there is no study of
comparable reliability to that ofCheckoway
(18) that has been negative. Resolution of
this question will depend on further large
cohort studies in which there are no impor-
tant confounding exposures and where esti-
mates of silica exposure are sufficient to
demonstrate an exposure-response relation-
ship, ifpresent. Legitimate scientific debate
exists as to whether crystalline silica causes
cancer in humans. IARC may have con-
cluded "probably," but other scientists
equally familiar with the data say "maybe
not.
No one disagrees that high exposures
to crystalline silica have been definitively
linked with silicosis; whether the same is
true for cancer is not known. The extent to
which any lung cancer risk associated with
silica exposure is confined to those with sil-
icosis cannot be answered at this stage.
This could only be accomplished by a
cohort study which can take into account
exposure, silicosis, and smoking. Although
studies using silicosis registries have raised
the question ofa link between lung cancer
risk and silica exposure, they cannot con-
tribute further to elucidating the realtion-
ship because of the unquantifiable selec-
tion bias in compensated worker popula-
tions.
Even more problematic uncertainties
exist if the crystalline silica data are to be
used to assess risks quantitatively at low
exposures. Which animal is most relevant
to human assessment? How high were
exposures in the past and (for risk charac-
terization) how high are they today? Even
more fundamentally, what was the particle
size distribution and crystalline silica con-
tent of the dust? To what extent is dura-
tion, as opposed to intensity, of exposure
important? Does age at time of exposure
matter? To what extent is any evidence of
increased lung cancer due to confounding
by smoking? What about other substances
to which studied workers were exposed?
Does any cancer effect occur only above
some threshold exposure? There can be no
doubt that different risk assessors will reach




Despite the absence ofscientific agreement
on whether silica causes cancer, the
California statutory scheme, triggered by
IARC, caused its regulators to attempt to
quantify human risk. Warnings could be
avoided under both the Proposition 65
and "hot spot" schemes ifrisks were found
to be insignificant.
Using the positive rat studies, Cali-
fornia's Department ofHealth and Human
Services drafted a QRA that estimated life-
time exposures of 0.04-0.2 pg/m3 posed a
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10-5 lifetime risk (the California level for
deeming a risk "insignificant") (20). The
authors, however, stressed that the appar-
ent exactitude of the numbers was decep-
tive. They noted many uncertainties,
including the inadequacy of, and inconsis-
tencies in, the rat data, the negative find-
ings in other species, and the possibility
that any human cancer risk "may occur
only after fibrosis (silicosis), a non-malig-
nant disease, is induced" (21: p. 5). They
concluded that their cancer predictions
"may, therefore, be inappropriate" (21).
Uncertainties of the animal data were
underscored by another assessment that
found a 10,000-fold difference between
cancer potencies predicted by two animal
and two epidemiology studies (potencies
ranging from 6.0 x 10-3 to 6.8 x 10-7 for
lifetime 1 ,ig/m3 exposures) (22).
The California assessors also developed
a preliminary noncancer, respiratory effects
reference exposure level (REL) of 1.2
pg/mi3 by dividing the American Con-
ference of Government Industrial Hy-
gienists threshold limit value (ACGIH
TLV) of 50 pg/mi3 by a time-adjustment
factor of4.2 and by a human intraspecies
uncertainty factor of 10 (25). Although
California used 50, the current ACGIH
TLV is 100.
Given the uncertainties admitted by its
assessors, California has withdrawn both its
cancer and silicosis risk assessments. The
California EPA explained that the assess-
ments were being "put on hold" until they
could be peer reviewed and discussed with
the public. The agency further noted that
it did not "feel it is necessarily appropriate
to use [such standards] as a basis for strin-
gent regulatory action" (23: p. 2).
California's uneasiness with its initial
QRA attempts continued in an assessment
conducted to determine whether local
facilities needed to warn neighbors under
the hot spots rules. The Monterey Bay
Unified Air Pollution District found air-
borne crystalline silica levels near a quar9v processing sand were 0.6 and 1.4 pg/mi,
but measurements in and around four
other areas in the district (Salinas,
Hollister, Santa Cruz, and King City) were
higher: 1.4, 1.9, 2.3, and 1.4 pg/mi3,
respectively (24). The air board also com-
missioned a health evaluation to quantify
cancer risk; it concluded that there was
"too much uncertainty regarding cancer
potency [values differing by a factor of
45,000] to make regulatory decisions."
At the same time California was back-
ing offits QRA conclusions, the U.S. EPA
also shelved its efforts to quantify non-
cancer silica risks. No doubt also sparked
by the IARC listing, EPA's Air Office
began receiving inquiries in the late 1980s
about the safety of ambient silica. It thus
began developing a reference concentration
(RfC), using its standard "safety margin"
assumptions to identify a level so low that
EPA could conclude no risk existed. Those
initial efforts pinpointed levels of0.03-2.0
pg/m3. But EPA backed offthese tentative
RfC calculations. Noting that crystalline
silica is a "complicated public health
issue," EPA's assistant administrator of
research and development wrote in early
1993 that the agency had not yet decided
whether to issue an RfC. EPA put offany
issuance until it reviews, in several years,
the National Ambient Air Quality
Standard for particulate matter (25).
In summary, both the U.S. EPA and
California halted their initial efforts to
quantify crystalline silica risks. Initial
attempts to set "safe" exposure levels for
both nonmalignant and malignant respira-
tory effects have been admitted to have
been so uncertain, despite the apparent
precision of the calculated numbers, that
theyshould not be credited.
The regulators are likely to face pres-
sures to employ their QRA apparatus
again. Indeed, California is doing so. As
discussed below, public policy would be
well-served if the machinery remains idle.
As one 1990 review of crystalline silica
concluded: "Caution is required but cau-
tion runs both ways. Current evidence
should not drive us inextricably toward
overlystringent regulation" (14: p. 235).
A Common-Sense Program
QRA may be an effective tool for policy
decision-making on potential health risks,
depending on the appropriateness of the
model and the completeness ofthe relevant
scientific database. It also depends on
whether a significant risk to the population
being protected is likely to be present and
ifany such risk can be mitigated. The the-
sis here is that public health would best be
served by focusing resources on ending
high occupational exposure and forsaking
further crystalline silica QRA efforts to
define low, safe levels.
More than uncertainty, however,
should cause public health officials to stop
any QRA momentum. First, it is becoming
increasingly clear that most human crys-
talline silica exposure occurs from sources
that cannot, and never will be, controlled.
Second, much work needs to be done to
eliminate high exposures to crystalline sili-
ca in some poorly controlled workplaces.
Crystalline silica all around us.
Extensive analyses ofambient air to deter-
mine crystalline silica concentrations have
not yet been conducted. What data do
exist indicate that concentrations in the
1-10 pg/m3 range-well above the prelim-
inarily calculated safe levels-are common
in both urban and rural settings.
A recent summary ofeight monitoring
studies concluded that the "average ambi-
ent crystalline silica" level was 6 pg/m3.
The authors noted that these values reflect-
ed the consequences ofboth anthropogenic
agricultural activities and natural forces
while "nearby industrial activity . . . con-
tributed only slightly to the crystalline sili-
ca within the samples collected" (26 p. 7).
As noted above, the Monterey Bay study
also found a quarry unlikely to be con-
tributing to ambient levels.
Pausing to consider the importance of
such ambient levels seems wise given the
mistakes (now admitted by EPA) that were
made with asbestos in buildings. EPA was
quick in 1982 to predict, based on QRA,
that up to 40,000 schoolchildren a year
would die of cancer because their schools
contained asbestos building materials. But,
by 1988, the agency got around to measur-
ing exposure levels in those schools and
found airborne asbestos levels were no dif-
ferent indoor than out. As a result, the
EPA admitted that it had unfortunately
encouraged unwarranted and undesirable
asbestos removal. It also helped to generate
needless fear in parents regarding putative
health risks to which their children were
subjected.
Learning from the asbestos error is
important to crystalline silica. Whatever
the quantitative risk of lifetime exposures
to crystalline silica may be, those risks have
been experienced by humans for centuries
and will continue in the future. As one
crystalline silica risk assessor concluded:
"There is the possibility that costly emis-
sion controls may be required that do little
to reduce public lung cancer risk" (22: p.
29). Continued QRA exercises are unlikely
to be ofany meaningful value to regulators
and would likely serve only to raise con-
cerns among those unwilling to tolerate
anyrisk.
The crystalline silica that should be
controlled. In contrast to the low crys-
talline silica concentrations all around us
are the hig h exposures (above the OSHA
100 pg/m permissible exposure level)
being reported in certain inadequately con-
trolled workplaces. The need to address
these exposures, especially in some sand-
blasting and rock-drilling occupations, has
become a focus of concern for NIOSH
(27). OSHA's Advisory Committee on
Construction Safety and Health has also
called for more attention to such work-
places (28).
As NIOSH has emphasized, the issue is
not assessing hypothetical risks or having
OSHA issue a QRA to justify reducing the
permissible exposure level. Rather, resources
are needed to end already unlawful prac-
tices. An Australian public health official
similarly concluded after conducting a silica
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QRA: "It is unlikely that a reduction in the
exposure standard will affect the overall
number of silicosis cases without a subse-
quent change in approach to enforcement
and self-compliance" (2-9 p. 11).
Industry has been criticized for using
QRAs to demand precision in assessing
risks. It has been advocated that, instead,
"What we should be doing is looking more
closely at the distribution ofdeath and dis-
ease, and then asking what portion can be
prevented" (30. p. 406). Focusing on elim-
inating high-exposure workplaces that may
be contributing to development ofsilicosis
provides a clear path to such prevention.
The ability of regulatory agencies to
deal effectively with chemical hazards is
limited both by staff and by the need to
respond to public concerns. Further work
on crystalline silica QRAs is unlikely to be
a valuable use of staff time or worthwhile
for regulatory program development.
Indeed, QRAs, given all their uncertain-
ties, are likely only to raise concerns that
cannot be addressed.
More significantly, any search for the
virtually safe exposure is likely to divert
resources from actions to end identifiable
workplace violations. Society may not
know, and may never know, if the crys-
talline exposures it cannot avoid pose
health risks of any consequence. Society
does know it can and should end work-
place exposures known to cause silicosis.
Resources should be focused on that task.
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of environmental exposure on human populations.
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and occupational toxicants; and the clinical and epidemiologic relationship of inhalational exposure to lung diseases of the
airway and interstitium, including asthma, fibrosis, granulomatosis, and malignancy.
Abstract deadline is February 1, 1995. For abstract forms or more information, contact:
Lee S. Newman, M.D., Box C272, University of Colorado Health Sciences Center, 4200 E. 9th Avenue, Denver, CO 80262
Telephone: (303) 270-7767 or FAX: (303) 270-5632.
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